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Abstract 
In the Soviet Union, the official command structure for economic production and distribution 
gave rise to, and depended upon, what has been described as a ‘shadow’ economy. In the 
postsocialist context, the unregulated, often extra-legal activities of production and exchange, 
encompassing the survival strategies of the poor, the emergence of postsocialist ‘Mafias’, and 
much entrepreneurial activity, has been described using the concept of the ‘informal 
economy’. This article argues that what we might think of as informal economic activity in 
Uzbekistan cannot be understood in relation to a formal economy, but is rather an expression 
of a more general informalisation of lifeworlds following the end of the Soviet Union. Unlike 
the situation in the Soviet Union, the informal does not emerge from and exist in relation to 
formal political and economic structures. The state itself is experienced in personalised terms, 
as a ‘Mafia’, and the informal is all that there is. If the concept of the informal depends on the 
existence of the formal, how useful is the term informal economy in a context like 
Uzbekistan? Where the state no longer provides a formal structure in practice, this is sought 
in moral ideals of state and community.  
 
 
 
 
The origin of the term informal economy has been attributed to papers written by the 
anthropologist Keith Hart in the early 1970s.1 He used it to refer to the irregular income 
earning opportunities of the urban poor in Ghana. In the typology he worked out at the time, 
formal income opportunities were made up of public and private sector wages and transfer 
payments, while informal opportunities encompassed the wide range of activities which fell 
outside the organised labour force. These included activities such as farming and market 
gardening, self-employed commodity production, petty trade, smuggling, theft and 
prostitution (Hart 1973). 
  For some time, informal economic activity has come to be understood in much 
broader terms than the survival strategies of sections of the urban poor in the ‘less developed 
                                                 
1
 This article is a substantially revised version of material previously published as a working paper 
(Rasanayagam 2003) 
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world’. The concept of ‘informalisation’ developed by Castells and Portes has been 
influential. They have described an expanding informalisation, both in poorer and wealthy 
economies, characterised by, among other things, decentralisation of networks of production 
and distribution, and the use of subcontracting to replace unionised labour in ways which 
enable corporations to take advantage of unregulated activities in a regulated environment. 
The informal economy in their analysis encompasses the illegal or unregulated activities of 
individuals struggling to make ends meet, but equally those of informal entrepreneurs and 
some of the activities of transnational corporations (Castells & Portes 1989). An important 
insight has been that there is no neat separation between a formal, state regulated and an 
informal, unregulated sector, as the latter is shaped in important ways by state regulation and 
integrated within transnational networks of production and exchange, something that a 
number of anthropologists have explored ethnographically (Mollona 2005; White 1994). Hart 
himself has revisited his earlier work, describing the informal economy in broader terms as ‘a 
market-based response of the people to the overweaning attempts of bureaucracy to control 
economic life from above’ (Hart 1992: 223). 
 Many of these insights have been confirmed in analysis of Soviet and postsocialist 
societies. In the context of the Soviet Union, a distinction has typically been made between 
the ‘state’ or ‘official’ economy, the production of goods and services within the socially 
owned sector subject to central planning, and the ‘unofficial’ or ‘shadow’ economy, activities 
undertaken by individuals for private gain, both legally sanctioned and illicit, which were not 
subject to the central planning process (Grossman 1977; Treml & Alexeev 1994). Here, the 
distinction is embedded in the ideological and institutional framework within which 
economic activity took place. At the same time, a number of observers have pointed out that 
it is impossible to draw a clear distinction between state and shadow economies, since they 
were each dependent upon the other and in fact formed two aspects of a single economy 
(Humphrey 1998: 146f.; Kotkin 1995:274). 
In the postsocialist context, analysis has been in terms of informal rather than shadow 
or second economies (Johnson et al. 1997; Kurkchiyan 2000; Rodgers & Williams 2009; Sik 
1992). This literature has pointed to how informal economies have grown out of the specific 
circumstances of the economic, political, and social transformations. Postsocialist informal 
economies are described in terms of the survival strategies of individuals struggling to make 
ends meet in the face of economic collapse and the withdrawal of state welfare and 
employment provision. They also encompass the activities of entrepreneurs operating outside 
the formal legal and regulatory structures, and the criminal and ‘Mafia’ activities which have 
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expanded in many post-Soviet republics. As in the Soviet Union, postsocialist informal 
economies are not distinct, self contained spheres of economic activity and exchange. In a 
previous article I described how in post-Soviet Uzbekistan the business and income 
generating activities of individuals, households and larger enterprises cannot easily be 
categorised as being distinctly formal or informal (Rasanayagam 2002).  
 In this article I argue that in Uzbekistan the informal economy is not simply 
embedded in or linked with a formal one. Rather, what we might think of as informal 
economic activity is just one expression of a more general informalisation of state, society 
and lifeworlds following the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the Soviet Union, state 
production plans could not have been fulfilled without the informal activities of enterprise 
managers and workers. The formal and the informal were organically linked within the 
everyday lives of Soviet citizens. Nevertheless, the state provided a clear ideological and 
material structure in relation to which informal activities and exchanges emerged, and gave 
those informal activities their distinctive character. In Uzbekistan, this structure no longer 
exists, as the state itself has become simply a ‘Mafia’ in the words of many of those I 
encountered during research. The concept of the informal economy implies a corresponding 
formal structure and practice of regulation and exchange. As Castells and Portes have put it, 
‘it is only because there is a formal economy (i.e., an institutional framework of economic 
activity) that we can speak of an ‘informal’ one’ (Castells & Portes 1989:13). The term 
‘informal economy’ carries with it the connotation of being abnormal, or exceptional to the 
rule in some way. In Uzbekistan, informalisation has become the rule, with no formal 
counterpart except in moral ideals of community and state expressed by many I encountered 
during field research. 
An examination of what we might view as informal economic activity exposes the 
informal nature of the state itself. By ‘the state’, I am not referring to institutional structures 
or welfare provision. Rather, I explore how the state becomes an object within the experience 
of citizens. A number of anthropologists have criticised the notion that the state is an 
objective, material realty, existing above and beyond the individual. The seeming reality of 
the state, they have argued, is an ideological project of domination (Abrams 1988) or, 
following a Foucault inspired analysis, a structural effect produced within relations of power 
(Mitchell 1999). The state is not a ‘thing’, then, but nevertheless takes shape, albeit 
contingently and situationally, through material phenomena, objects, institutions, and 
relations (Harvey 2005). Located and contingent instantiations the state emerge within the 
everyday experience of people engaging in transactions of one sort or another; in the 
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particular constraints and possibilities, risks and opportunities, of setting up and running 
business ventures, in obtaining land from a collective farm to use for private plot production, 
or in the encounters that a marshrutka taxi driver negotiates with traffic policemen on his 
route. 
Akhil Gupta has argued that the discourse of corruption is an arena where the state, as 
well as the idea of what it is to be a citizen, is imagined and constituted. How people talk 
about corruption, what they classify as corruption, and the moral categories into which they 
place acts which could be viewed as corruption, independent of their formal legality, is 
important for understanding how people conceptualise the boundaries of the state and 
themselves in relation to it (Gupta 1995). The study of corruption in postsocialist societies 
has proved a productive site for exploring the moral evaluations of transforming political and 
economic circumstances and imaginings of moral personhood and community (Polese 2008; 
Sneath 2006; Werner 2000). This article explores the state in Uzbekistan that emerges within 
the experience of individuals as they engage in informal economic activities. It explores how 
discourses on corruption are a site of moral reasoning where individuals reflect on this 
experience, and develop and contest conceptions of legitimate governance and ideals of state 
and moral community.  
 This article is based on two periods of field research in Uzbekistan. The first was 
conducted in the city of Andijan and a nearby village I am calling Pakhtabad from 1998-
2000. The second was for 10 months in the city of Samarkand and Pakhtabad, between 2003 
and 2004. The language of communication was predominantly Uzbek, with Russian in 
Andijan and Samarkand cities. The research was undertaken through what anthropologists 
tend to gloss as ‘participant observation’. However, this is an inadequate or even misleading 
description of what anthropologists do ‘in the field’. One of the most satisfying accounts of 
the nature of anthropological knowledge, and of the doing of anthropological research, that I 
have come across is Michael Carrithers’ description of anthropology as a moral science of 
possibilities (Carrithers 2005). Carrithers describes fieldwork as an engaged learning, an 
opening up to the rationalities and moral perspectives of others. It is an embodied practice 
which is constituted not so much by the discovery of facts and the gathering of data, but by 
the labours, rigours, embarrassments and adjustments of the engaged learner. 
Anthropological research is a sharing of perspectives, where the anthropologist inhabits 
alternative lifeworlds and moral frames, possibilities for being and conceiving the world. The 
‘truth’ of the research I have conducted in Uzbekistan is not founded on a notion of statistical 
significance, where surveys or interviews with a limited group of informants can stand for a 
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wider population. What I aspire to is a decentring of the categories we tend to think with, and 
to suggest alternative possibilities for how we might conceive of, and act within, the world.  
 
The context of Uzbekistan 
Since Uzbekistan became independent in 1991 a number of economic reforms have been 
implemented. Consumer prices have been largely liberalised, small scale enterprises, 
particularly those in the retail sector, and some larger ones have been privatised as well as 
most of the housing stock, and entrepreneurial activity is now legal. As a result there has been 
a mushrooming of petty commodity production and trade activity, such as shoe and knife 
making, private retail shops and stalls and other micro businesses. However, the central 
government retains a large measure of control over strategic sectors of the economy. Cotton 
has historically been an important export crop for Uzbekistan and state procurement plans 
continue to be issued for its delivery by collective farms, as well as for wheat. State 
monopolies are maintained over strategic commodities such as gold, oil and gas, as well as 
over the processing of raw cotton, and the central government retains effective control over 
large enterprises even if they have been partly privatised. In general, petty commodity 
production and trade conducted at the level of a single individual or household has developed 
greatly since independence, while larger enterprises and the large scale exploitation of 
resources are subject to varying degrees of central government control. High taxes and levels 
of regulation effectively force any business or enterprise between these extremes to operate 
with some degree of illegality (Rasanayagam 2002). 
 Small businesses engage in a combination of legal and illegal transactions and I was 
often told by traders and entrepreneurs that it was impossible to operate completely within the 
law at all times. The following case of a privately run oshkhona (a cafeteria-type restaurant 
serving Uzbek cuisine) is an example. The owner of this oshkhona reported how a gas 
inspector only gave him authorisation to operate two gas fired cauldrons instead of the four 
needed so that he could collect bribes to ignore the operation of the other two. The owner 
claimed that he paid a patent for some of his employees, the two main cooks, but not for the 
other workers who were thus employed illegally.2 In addition, he had been refused a licence 
to run the oshkhona until he paid a bribe of US$1000 to the city hokim (governor) or his 
deputy which he had not done, so he was operating without official registration. While the 
oshkhona was operating openly and the owner was acting within the law in many respects, at 
                                                 
2
 A patent is a tax in the form of a fixed monthly fee. Micro business run by one person or household 
(fizicheskoe litso) pay this form of tax, and by law a patent must be paid for each worker in the café. 
Page 5 of 21 International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
6 
 
the same time a large part of his business was technically illegal. This ambiguous status was 
largely engineered by the state regulatory officials themselves. 
It is impossible to distinguish between clearly defined informal and formal 
economies. More than this, in Uzbekistan the informal character of economic activity is an 
expression of a more general informalisation of lifeworlds, one which is no longer defined in 
relation to a ‘formal’ sphere of governance or economy. In the following section I will 
describe the nature of these lifeworlds, and the section after that discusses the informalised 
nature of the state itself. This will be discussed in relation to the situation in the Soviet past 
where the informal emerged from a formal political and economic structure. The final section 
will discuss the moral ideals of state and community expressed in discourses of corruption. 
 
Informalised lifeworlds: Household, land, and the collective farm 
Tohirjon is a teacher in one of the schools in the village of Pakhtabad in the Fergana Valley.3 
He was in his mid-to-late 30s at the time of my research, and was the head of his household, 
which consisted of his wife, their four daughters, and his mother. His brothers had married 
and settled in their own separate household compounds. His household income was made up 
of a number of sources, as is typical in the village, including his salary from teaching in the 
school, his mother’s pension, child support payments, private English classes to coach 
students to pass the university entrance examinations, production from land he had obtained 
as household plots from the collective farm (amounting to about a quarter of a hectare by 
2004), and raising bull calves for sale as beef. Salaries from state jobs such as teaching are 
low (Tohirjon’s salary from the school was $20), and need to be supplemented with other 
sources of income. Agricultural production is an important element of this in rural areas 
(Rasanayagam 2002). In Torhirjon’s case, it made up around 70% of his household income in 
2000, although on my second visit in 2004 this was much less profitable and his private 
teaching had become more significant. 
 An account of Torhirjon’s efforts to secure land plots from the collective farm is 
illustrative of the ‘informal’ nature of income generating activities, and how the state emerges 
within this experience. According to the Law on Dehqon farming of 1998 (articles 7 and 8) 
all those employed on a collective farm, as well as doctors, teachers and other specialists, are 
entitled to be granted household plots (priusadebnyi zemel’nyi uchastok in Russian, tomorqa 
in Uzbek) of up to 0.35 of a hectare from collective farm land. The actual amount allocated is 
                                                 
3
 All names are pseudonyms, as is the name of the village. 
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left up to the local collective farm and local government authorities Although this land 
continues to be publicly owned, villagers have use rights over the plots for their lifetime 
which can be passed on to their descendants. People talked about household plots as if they 
were their own property. In addition, in Pakhtabad land was rented from the collective farm 
for a few months after the wheat harvest in June, when production for the state plan has been 
completed, until the next planting of wheat or cotton in late autumn, and villagers approach 
the brigadiers directly for this land.4 
 In 1998 Tohirjon approached the collective farm chairman for an extra 10 sotok (0.1 
of a hectare) as a household plot since people are entitled to this upon marriage. At the time, 
he had 6 sotok attached to his household compound which had previously been his parents’ 
home. He was refused on the grounds that since he lived in the parental household he would 
not need an extra plot to build a new house. Sometime later he met a member of the viloyat 
(provincial) land commission by chance at a bus stop in a neighbouring village, and as they 
chatted it turned out that the commissioner came from the same village as one of Tohirjon’s 
work colleagues. Tohirjon told him about his need for an extra plot and the commissioner 
agreed to help. Six months later, the commissioner’s brother, who was also a member of the 
land commission, visited Tohirjon and agreed to arrange for him to be granted land for a 
bribe of 50,000 Sum (about $100 at the time) for 10 sotok. The commissioner arranged things 
with the collective farm chairman, district and provincial authorities and in the end Tohirjon 
received 8 sotok for which he paid 40,000 Sum. This land was registered at the Village 
Committee (the lowest state administrative unit) in his name for land tax purposes. In this 
transaction what is being ‘bought’ for the bribe is the official registration of this land as 
Tohirjon’s household plot (priusadebnyi uchastok/tomorqa). 
 The next year he and many other villagers were approached by the collective farm 
management offering to sell more land (these were extra-judicial transactions) and this time 
he paid 85,000 Sum for two 10 sotok plots. Before this land was registered with the Village 
Committee, however, the collective farm chairman was replaced and the new chairman, 
under pressure to fulfil the state production plan for cotton and wheat, threatened to reclaim 
all the land which had been illegally sold. Because of the large number of people involved 
who had all paid substantial amounts of money (I was told that about 500 people had bought 
land in this way, although details were hard to verify) he did not immediately reclaim the 
land, but reduced the plot allotments from 10 to 6 sotok, and froze the granting of further 
                                                 
4
 Deniz Kandiyoti has written extensively on different strategies by which people gain access to land in 
Uzbekistan (Kandiyoti 1999; 2002; 2003). 
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household plots for married couples. The Village Committee was refusing to register the land 
in the new owners’ names so they had no formalised legal claim on it. This affair was not 
restricted to the collective farm management as sellers and villagers as buyers. Decisions to 
transfer land to use as household plots must be ratified by the district and provincial 
government authorities so the relevant officials in those bodies also had to be involved, as the 
involvement of the viloyat land commission officials indicates, and the Village Committee 
had to register the land in the villagers’ names. During my second visit to the village in 2004 
Tohirjon was once more in negotiations to ‘purchase’ more land, another 6 sotok, for $400, 
and I was told that the farm and local government authorities were in the process of 
regularising the previous illegal transfers by gradually registering the land officially as 
household plots. 
 These transactions need to be placed in the wider context of land use on this collective 
farm. According to its former chief accountant who had retired in 2000, before independence 
in 1991 the collective farm comprised around 2500 hectares but in 2004 it directly controlled 
only about 600 hectares. Over the years, most of its land has been distributed, either in the 
form of household plots or different types of private farming contracts.5 The latter, covering 
about 1500 hectares according to the former accountant, include a large livestock farm of 
over 300 hectares which has been granted on the basis of a long term lease, and numerous 
smaller farms which lease up to 4 hectares. Private commercial farms do not have free use of 
this land but are contractually obliged to fulfil the production plan handed down by state 
authorities to the collective farm to produce wheat or cotton. As Tommaso Trevisani has 
shown, the de-collectivisation process in Uzbekistan, which has ostensibly aimed at a greater 
commercialisation of agricultural production, has not diminished central government control 
but only made it a little more indirect (Trevisani 2009). 
 In 2001 the collective farm was converted into a shirkat. This represents a 
transformation in the structure of accountability. The direct hierarchy of command and 
control inherited from the Soviet system, where production plans were passed down from the 
centre to regions and ultimately to state and collective farms, has been replaced by a 
‘contract’ system which is equally accountable to central planning.  The farm’s central 
administration became the main shirkat, responsible for fulfilling the state delivery plan for 
cotton and wheat, and subcontracts production to the brigades which have themselves 
become smaller shirkat. In turn, the ‘brigade’ shirkat distribute similar contracts to individual 
                                                 
5
 For accounts of agricultural reforms see Trevisani (2009) and Ilkhamov (1998). 
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households, supplying all non-labour inputs while the households provide labour and deliver 
a contracted amount of produce. 
 The former collective farm accountant admitted that there are far too many workers to 
be supported by the limited land remaining in the shirkat. There were around 2000 villagers 
registered as farm workers, and each household needed to be given at least some land. Most 
have around 0.3 of a hectare to manage. The example of how a brigade leader managed his 
land just before the transition to a shirkat is illustrative. This brigade was responsible for 
farming 35 hectares of land (16 for wheat and 19 for cotton at the time of my research) and 
had 80 people officially on its books. However, only four of these worked full time. These 
were the only workers within the brigade who were able to make a significant income from 
the land as they were each allocated four hectare plots on which to grow wheat by contract. It 
is worthwhile looking after the large wheat plots as the worker can keep any wheat in excess 
of the contracted amount to be delivered at the relatively low state price, and a full time 
worker told me that he had received two tons of surplus wheat in this way, worth about 
160,000 Sum ($320) on the open market. 
Working cotton land is not so profitable, however. The brigade leader divided this 
land among his part-time workers, mostly women, in small, 0.2 or 0.3 hectare plots so that 
everyone had at least some land to work. Cotton land was ploughed, planted and fertilised as 
a unit by the brigade’s full time workers using tractors while the part time workers were 
responsible for the manual work of weeding and harvesting cotton on the small plots 
allocated to them. The benefits from working such plots are minimal. Workers earned a small 
income from harvesting the cotton (usually about $10 for the whole harvest), and they had the 
right to use the cotton plant stalks for winter fuel. Within the collective farm wages are not 
paid in cash, but recorded in cash terms and this can be used as credit to pay gas, electricity 
and other utilities charges. Workers also typically received a sack of wheat (50kg) and other 
vegetables such as onions or potatoes for the year’s work. 
An important incentive for people to work within the collective farm despite low 
returns was that in order to qualify for child support and other state benefits people have to be 
employed in an official organisation, although these payments are very small. Moreover, 
undertaking collective farm work did not take time away from other occupations. Part time 
workers I interviewed estimated that their official work on the farm took up only about 50 
days a year outside the harvest period, and as it is shared by all the women in the household it 
does not stop people from engaging in other income generating or subsistence activities. 
When I asked an older female worker why she continued to work for such little return, she 
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replied that the cotton stalks she collected at the end of harvest would be enough for most of 
her household’s winter heating and cooking needs, and that if she was busy her kelin 
(daughter-in-law) could do the work for her. This is comparable to a study of a village in 
neighbouring Fergana province undertaken by the Russian anthropologist Sergei Abashin, 
who found that during the 1990s the collective farm he studied employed 2000 workers, out 
of a total work-age population of the village of 5000. Of these 2000 only 60 were full time, 
working over 300 days a year. The remainder worked only two to three months on the 
collective farm (Abashin 1997).  
Households adopt a multi-stranded strategy which incorporates work in the collective 
farm (or by contract to the shirkat as it has become), in other state institutions or enterprises 
such as one of the village schools, or in the private cotton processing plant located next to the 
village. In addition to agricultural production on household plots for sale and home 
consumption, a household will typically also engage in a range of income generating activity. 
Craft production such as shoe making, leather tanning or knife making is common in 
Pakhtabad. Such enterprises are run by an usta (master craftsman) with a number of shogird 
(apprentices) who work for little or no pay. Many villagers are house builders and decorators 
or carpenters and work locally, in Tashkent, or in neighbouring countries. Other ventures 
include small shops, chicken farms with up to 200 hens for egg production, cotton seed oil 
production, or small scale flour mills. People who engage in trade either transport agricultural 
produce, mainly tomatoes, peppers, and fruit, to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan or Russia, or buy 
consumer goods from Tashkent or neighbouring countries for resale locally. A significant 
savings and investment strategy is the raising of livestock, mainly bull calves for sale as beef. 
These goods and services are sold directly in local bazaars or through middlemen. 
Even during the Soviet period, when the collective farm was a much larger economic 
and political presence and most households contained at least one member who was a farm 
worker, villagers were not completely dependent on their official income. Working from 
survey data on household expenditure in Osh oblast, Kyrgyzstan in 1988, the Russian 
ethnologist Segrei Poliakov estimates that 70% of the population made a living within the 
non-state, unregualted economy (Poliakov 1992:89-90). He states that a large proportion of 
Central Asia’s rural population took no part in public production in collective and state farms 
and other state enterprises. In the Karl Marx state farm in Leninabad Oblast in the Tajikistan 
part of the Fergana Valley only 650 such jobs were available among a working population of 
20,000. On the basis of this he deduces that 85% must have been engaged primarily in private 
commodity production (Poliakov 1992:42). Villagers in Pakhtabad claimed that before 
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independence, income from their plots was about equal to official income. This is comparable 
with Abashin’s study which found that in 1990, just before independence, for a typical 
household private plot production made up between 35% to 40% of total income, the rest 
being state salaries, including from employment on the collective farm (Abashin 1997).  
The change since independence is much more than simply a reduction in official 
wages or a shift in the balance of income between state and private sources. There has 
certainly been a drastic reduction of state welfare provision. Salaries in state institutions have 
become at best only a small supplement to household income, and pensions, child support 
and other transfer payments are also very small. Access to healthcare is nominally free, but in 
practice doctors often demand bribes for adequate treatment. Housing has been privatised and 
is no longer provided through employment in a state organisation or enterprise. This article 
argues that the informalisation of economic activities which is evident in the description of 
household income generating strategies I have provided is an aspect of a more general 
informalisation in lifeworlds. In Uzbekistan, it is not so much that an informal economy 
emerges in relation to a state regulated formal structure. Tohirjon’s experience of seeking 
land from the collective farm is an expression of the more general informalisation of state and 
society. 
 
The informalised state in Uzbekistan 
Of course, what has been called the shadow or second economy was a well documented 
feature of Soviet society. A number of observers have also shown that it was not a distinct 
and separate sphere, but the ‘second economy’ and the centrally planned structures of 
production and distribution were integral to one another (Humphrey 1998; Kotkin 1995; 
Rasanayagam 2002). However, in the Soviet Union a clear vision of citizen and state was 
nevertheless expressed in official discourse and enacted in social and material provision. The 
Soviet state was a transformative and totalising project which aimed to reshape not only the 
economic system and society, but also the human person. The ideal of the Soviet citizen was 
not the autonomous individual of the liberal Western imagination, but entered society as a 
member of a collective, for example a work collective or a class group in school or 
university. All able bodied citizens were obliged to work in the social sector, in a state 
enterprise or cooperative integrated within the structures of central planning. Those who 
existed independently were positioned outside of this vision and were officially termed 
parasites, for example ‘speculators’ who traded outside the official distribution networks, or 
teachers who gave private lessons to children to pass entrance exams. The work collective 
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was itself a total social institution, providing facilities for art and cultural activities, sport, 
holidays, special interest clubs and tourist trips (Zinoviev 1984). They were a means to 
fashion a socialist moral subject who embodied collective goals and values and was 
committed to building a socialist society (Hoffmann 2003; Kharkhordin 1999). 
 This is not to say that the New Soviet Person became a reality, that state discourse 
was indeed internalised by Soviet citizens. Numerous studies have described the informal, 
unregulated circulation of goods and services within circles of friendship and acquaintance 
(Ledeneva 1998), or the more extractive practices of bribery and tribute taking which 
operated within hierarchies of Party, state and enterprise (Lubin 1984; Zemtsov 1976). A 
disjuncture between a public performance in line with the dominant state discourse and an 
alternative private stance became commonplace (Kharkhordin 1999; Kotkin 1995). Alexei 
Yurchak has made the important observation that this did not necessarily express or imply 
opposition to the Soviet state, but is better understood as what he calls ‘deterritorialisation’ in 
relation to the state’s authoritative discourse. By a public performance, individuals 
reproduced themselves as proper Soviet citizens, which allowed them to occupy an 
alternative sociality, often in work-places, clubs and societies which were themselves enabled 
by the official Soviet state structures (Yurchak 2006). In the Soviet Union, the second 
economy emerged from, and was in a mutually dependent relation with, the official structures 
of central planning, production and distribution. In a similar way, the alternative socialities 
occupied by Soviet citizens were enabled by the authoritative discourse of the Soviet state 
and its practical application. 
 In post-independence Uzbekistan, the formal state in this sense is absent. The state 
has retreated from the social and material provision as has already been shown through the 
experience of villagers in Pakhtabad. The collective farm, now a shirkat, is no longer a total 
social institution, but primarily a vehicle for the extraction of agricultural products by central 
government. It no longer provides meaningful salaries and services to its workers, but is at 
best a limited and intermittent a source of small parcels of land, often acquired through 
informal channels, for villagers to use to provide for themselves.  
The post-independence government has produced its own national ideology, but this 
is qualitatively different from the Soviet project it replaces. Soviet state discourse constituted 
a formal structure in relation to which alternative informal spaces came into being, and gave 
these spaces a certain coherence, stability, and security. By contrast, the post-Soviet ‘Idea of 
National Independence’ is intended to legitimate the authoritarian rule of President Karimov. 
It is a practical tool for monitoring and controlling the population, for identifying dissent and 
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intervening to suppress it. This ideology is founded upon a construction of an essentialised 
Uzbek cultural and spiritual heritage, a ‘golden heritage’ to which the nation is returning after 
decades of Soviet rule. Cultural authenticity has become a category which, far from providing 
a stable formal space in relation to which alternative informal spaces emerge, has produced a 
state of existential insecurity and vulnerability, where the actions and performance of citizens 
might be characterised as culturally inauthentic and therefore potentially subject to the 
intervention of the state security apparatuses (Rasanayagam 2011:121-179).  
The post-Soviet state in Uzbekistan is experienced as the personalised and often 
arbitrary exercise of power. Commands and directives originate in the ministries in Tashkent, 
and are passed through the hierarchical structures of government administration. At the local 
level of practical implementation, however, they are often experienced as the extractive, 
extrajudicial actions of individual state officials, whether district governors, city public 
prosecutors, or traffic policemen. For example, state discourse extols the mahalla, a 
residential neighbourhood institution, as an embodiment of Uzbek tradition and a repository 
of the nation’s spiritual heritage, and the post-independence government has revived and 
formalised the mahalla as a self governing institution with a locally elected leadership. In 
practical terms, however, central government uses the mahalla and its leadership as a means 
to monitor and control the population. It attempts to co-opt the bonds of neighbourhood 
sociality, the locally rooted norms of authority, reciprocity and obligation, as a tool of 
governance that extends beyond official state structures. Local district and city governors in 
their turn treat the institution of the mahalla committee as an extension of their own 
executive powers, even though in official legal terms the mahalla, as a self governing 
institution, is independent of the structures of government administration. They instruct 
mahalla leaderships to collect unpaid gas and electricity bills from their residents, or to force 
residents to pay unpaid taxes (Rasanayagam 2009). The local governor of one of the districts 
of Samarkand city in 2003 even ordered mahalla committee chairmen to organise the 
collection of scrap metal from residents in order to supply the needs of enterprises in his 
territory, threatening to fire chairmen who refused.6 In Pakhtabad village, I was told by 
teachers in 2004 that the previous year they had been forced to ‘voluntarily donate’ a day’s 
pay in order to help finance the renovation of a local stadium by the district government. In 
Samarkand in 2003, a marshrutka taxi driver complained to me that the traffic police were 
stopping taxis and demanding 5000 sum (about $3 at the time) to make up shortfalls in the 
                                                 
6
 Mahalla chairmen are elected by residents and district governors have no legal authority to directly appoint or 
dismiss them, although they do need to approve their appointment. 
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non-payment of charges for exemptions from full military service. 
These informal, extrajudicial interventions and extractions by state officials merge 
with the ubiquitous, everyday corruption of bribes and extractions for personal profit which 
are a part of almost every encounter with officials in Uzbekistan. The taxi driver who is 
forced to pay a levy towards shortfalls in charges for military service by a traffic policeman 
one day, might be forced to pay a bribe by a policeman on some pretext or other the next. The 
point is that the state itself is experienced as informal and personal. 
 
Discourses of corruption and the state 
During a conversation with a group of villagers in Pakhtabad, the topic turned to corruption 
and how a private farmer, present at the time, was being forced to pay one ton of wheat to 
court officials to avoid a possible prison sentence. One of the villagers declared that 
government officials were a Mafia, as they stole money from the state. People often used the 
idiom of the Mafia to express the exploitative activities of state officials. ‘In Uzbekistan, the 
Mafia is the state’ commented an entrepreneur who was complaining that he had given up 
trying to run a business because of the number of police and other officials demanding pay-
offs. ‘Officials are queen bees who do nothing but feed on workers’ complained another who 
was having trouble getting a bank loan without paying a bribe. 
 In post-Soviet Russia and Mongolia, Caroline Humphrey and David Sneath have 
identified pyramidal extraction chains which operate within the formal structures of state 
organs, like the Tax Inspectorate (Humphrey & Sneath 2004). Villagers in Pakhtabad talked 
about similar chains, and claimed that district hokim (head of the district administration) pay 
bribes for their appointments and then demand similar payments from collective farm 
chairmen and enterprise heads under their authority. The sale of land in the village I 
described earlier is an expression of this. In 2000 I was told that a flour mill in a nearby town 
had been without a director for six months because the prospective candidate for the post was 
unable to come up with enough money for the bribe. Alisher Ilkhamov has reported similar 
claims about a district hokim in Fergana Province who was said to have paid $50,000 for his 
appointment and then imposed an annual tribute of $10,000 on each of the 4 collective farms, 
as well as smaller impositions on other enterprises, firms and shops in his jurisdiction. The 
hokim then gave the collective farm and enterprise managers freedom to raise the money any 
way they could, legally or illegally (Ilkhamov 2000).  
 Such chains or pyramids of corruption operating within official state structures is not 
of course a purely post-Soviet phenomenon. Ilya Zemtsov, writing about Soviet Azerbaijan in 
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the 1960s and 1970s, has described hierarchical chains of corruption linking warehouse 
managers and collective farm brigadiers to ministers and First Secretaries in the Republican 
Communist Party. He reports that bribes were paid for senior appointments in the Communist 
Party and for such appointments as chairman of a collective farm, rector of an institute of 
higher education and head of certain enterprises.7 The ‘tariff’ was determined by demand 
which in turn depended on the income generating possibilities of the position (Zemtsov 
1976:21f.). 
Nancy Lubin, who conducted a study of work and income in Uzbekistan in the 1980’s 
found that the bribes paid to enter higher education institutes reflected in part the illicit 
income earning possibilities on graduation. Although the highest official salaries were paid in 
heavy industry and for those jobs involving high levels of skill and training, such as air traffic 
controller, applications for agricultural and medical institutes, and the bribes paid to enter 
them, were higher than for institutes providing training for heavy industry. The bribes paid 
for appointment to jobs in services and agriculture were also higher which reflected the 
greater opportunities to earn unofficial incomes through embezzlement and plundering in 
these sectors. This picture is supported by villagers in Pakhtabad who claimed that during the 
Soviet period the highest bribes were needed to enter the History Faculty of the Pedagogical 
Institute, followed by the Medical and Agricultural Institutes. This was because the History 
Faculty was seen as a path for entry into the Communist Party and, as cotton was such an 
important crop for Uzbekistan, a career in agriculture was a means of securing senior posts in 
local government. 
Although bribery and corruption were commonplace in the Soviet period, the 
subjective experience of it has changed, reflecting the changed nature of the state in 
Uzbekistan. In common with other post-Soviet societies, a widely shared perception is that 
while corruption existed in the past, it became much more widespread after socialism 
(Humphrey & Sneath 2004; Sneath 2006). A former worker in the railway depot in the city of 
Andijan recollected that in the past it had been possible to complain to higher authorities in 
Tashkent or Moscow, but now these channels no longer work and the police, judiciary and 
local government officials all cooperate at the local level to cover each other. She recounted 
her own experience in the mid-1980s when she discovered that her supervisor had forged her 
signature on documents claiming that engines had been repaired in order to pocket the money 
himself. When she confronted him, he discredited her and had her committed to a mental 
                                                 
7
 Simis describes similar horizontal and vertical networks in the Soviet Union (1982:78-85) 
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health institution. However, through contacts in the KGB who gave her a recording device, 
she managed to collect enough evidence to prove her case to higher authorities and eventually 
her boss was convicted and she was ‘rehabilitated’ in the local newspapers.  
These recollections of corruption cannot be taken as representations of an objectively 
‘real’ past. Memories are more productively understood as moral commentaries and 
responses to the individual’s experience of the present (Berdahl 1999; Lambek 1996). But 
this is precisely what makes these accounts informative. They indicate an important shift in 
experience of the state in everyday lives. While corruption existed in the past, the Soviet 
Union is recalled as a stable and ultimately reliable state structure. As has been discussed in 
the previous section, the state provided for the material needs of citizens and enabled secure 
social spaces, even alternative spaces outside the authoritative state project as Yurchak has 
described, so long as citizens formally reproduced themselves as ‘proper’ Soviet citizens 
through an appropriate public performance. Much of what might be described as corrupt 
transactions were carried out through positively evaluated relationships of friendship and 
relatedness. By contrast, a number of anthropologists have observed that the de-socialisation 
and privatisation introduced with market reforms has been experienced by many in post-
Soviet space as ‘wild capitalism’ governed by Mafias and rackets and lacking in social 
relations (Anderson 2000; Humphrey 1999). 
In Uzbekistan, I rarely heard people talk in terms of wild markets or capitalism. On 
the contrary, a common comparison made with neighbouring Central Asian states and Russia, 
especially by those engaged business or cross border trade, was that the Mafia and other 
rackets were much less prevalent in Uzbekistan. Instead, they frequently made comments to 
the effect that in Uzbekistan the Mafia was ‘legal’, that the state authorities themselves had a 
monopoly of Mafia activities. I would argue that the characterisation of the state itself as a 
Mafia is not so much an observation that corruption has increased in quantitative terms, but 
reflects a shift in how the state is experienced in everyday lives. The Soviet-era formal 
structures of material provision and support, and the ideological framework within which this 
was embedded, has disappeared, and the state has become personalised. The idiom of the 
Mafia expresses the oppressive and extractive nature of this experience, but at the same time, 
as the account of the ‘sale’ of land in Pakhtabad has shown, the personalised state can also 
open up space for negotiation by citizens to further their own projects and interests, 
something which is reflected in how people in Pakhtabad talk about corruption.  
Tohirjon, the teacher I mentioned in previous sections, sometimes criticised the 
corrupt practices of officials. On one occasion he condemned nepotism in hiring and 
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promotion at the local cotton processing plant. He said that this sort of corruption impeded 
the development of the country and he described bribery as a national illness. On another 
occasion, Tohirjon overheard his elder brother telling me about a case he had seen on 
television of a young man who had been given a heavy prison sentence for stealing some 
bread. ‘Here collective farm officials steal much more, by that scale they should all be shot’ 
his brother declared. Tohirjon intervened, saying that although his brother was so indignant 
about corruption, he would be the first to engage in it if it benefited his family and Tohirjon 
himself had bribed the Village Committee to grant his family poverty relief for six months. 
He had also bought fertiliser illegally from the manager of the collective farm warehouse, a 
common practice in the village. 
Tohirjon distinguishes between earning money on the side through the use of 
resources available through work (levyi den’gi as he called it) and pora (the Uzbek word for 
bribery), although he claimed that he does not judge the morality of either situation and the 
buyer of the services is certainly not doing any wrong in his opinion. He described his actions 
of buying fertiliser (levyi den’gi for the warehouse manager) and bribing to be registered for 
poor relief as ‘finding a way’ (yo’l topmok) and ‘entrepreneurship’ (tadbirkorlik). One of his 
plans was to produce a crib to sell to students sitting the university entrance exams, and he 
had overheard a student at the vocational college where he taught offer another teacher $100 
to sit one of his exams for him. That teacher refused, asking $200, and Tohirjon told me he 
would be willing to do it if the student’s parents could protect him from the authorities. He 
viewed these activities as business or money making ventures, similar to the private 
university entrance test preparation courses he offered, or growing crops on his plots for sale. 
He did not seem to distinguish between his legal and illegal ventures, they were all part of his 
household money making strategy. I asked him if he considered producing the cribs as 
corruption and he replied that it was a ‘little corruption’, it did not hurt anyone. When I asked 
if it was fair on the students who did not cheat, he said ‘it is a time for entrepreneurship’. 
Intelligent students who were not capable enough to get a crib would not succeed in the real 
world anyway, since now money is the only important thing and stupid people with money 
are the ones who succeed. 
How should we interpret these contradictory attitudes, and also the other practices of 
‘corruption’ described above, such as the extra-legal extractions of traffic policemen. They 
might simply express an instrumental self interest, which views the appropriations of others 
as corrupt, whereas one’s own actions are characterised as doing the best for one’s self, 
family or community. Alternatively, the contrasting judgements might be produced by the 
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application of different moral frames which are invoked contextually. Cynthia Werner has 
argued that moral evaluations of the legitimacy of a transaction are contextually determined, 
depending on the subject position of the person making the judgement and the relation 
between the giver and the receiver, so that distinctions between gifts and bribes are blurred 
(Werner 2000). Abel Polese similarly explores the contextual morality and shifting categories 
of gift and bribe, where judgements are made with reference to the retreat of the state from 
the provision of realistic levels of pay and social services, and the strategies for survival this 
makes necessary (Polese 2008). David Sneath, discussing corruption in Mongolia, develops 
this perspective further when he argues that transfers of goods and assistance can 
productively be understood as materialisations of social relations, positively evaluated when 
they express ties of obligation and expectation within networks of kinship and friendship, and 
illegitimate when associated with instrumental, impersonal, ‘market’ exchanges (Sneath 
2006).  
I argue that these discourses also emerge from a wider experience of the 
informalisation of the state and of lif worlds. Alongside condemnation of state officials as 
Mafia, they can be understood as a moral critique of the present situation, in contrast with the 
Soviet past, and a bitter resignation to the demands of the present. Castells and Portes have 
argued that the informal economy only makes sense in relation to formal structures of state 
regulation. The Soviet state provided a formal economic and ideological structure which 
enabled particular dynamics and formations of informal exchange and sociality. In present 
day Uzbekistan, the state itself has become informalised and personalised. What we might 
call the informal economy is an expression of this more general informalisation of lifeworlds, 
so that in an important sense the informal is all that there is. 
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